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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
 
Plaintiff-appellant in the proceedings below was Elizabeth Bennet. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 





 The opinions below appear in the transcript of record. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The court of appeals entered judgment on June 5, 2014.  (R. at 21).  Petitioner 
filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on June 24, 2014.  (R. at 23).  This Court granted 
the Petition on October 15, 2014.  (R. at 24).  This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(1) (2012). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
them are reviewed for clear error.  Its legal conclusion are reviewed de novo. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTE 
Relevant provisions of the U.S. Constitution and the Civil Action for Deprivation 
of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983, are reproduced in an appendix to this brief.
	  1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
In August 2008, Elizabeth Bennet (“Professor Bennet”) was hired as an assistant 
professor of English Literature at the College of Southern Pemberley (“CSP”), and began 
teaching in September of that year.  (R. at 3).  In January 2013, George Wickham 
(“Wickham”) enrolled in Professor Bennet’s English class after transferring to CSP from 
New York University.  (R. at 3).  Wickham’s exceptional athletic skills made him an 
asset to CSP’s basketball team, helping the team improve significantly, attain 
unprecedented victories, and attract national recognition and coverage.  (R. at 3).  During 
this time, the Southern Pemberley Daily News began reporting on the special treatment 
that Wickham received due to his elite athletic status.  (R. at 3).  In late March, the 
newspaper reported that Wickham was given new Senior-Only housing. and that he was 
excused from taking two of his midterms.  (R. at 3).  A month later, the newspaper’s 
editorials criticized CSP’s administration, reporting that, upon a request from CSP’s 
dean, professors were to excuse all of Wickham’s absences—regardless if they were 
related to the basketball team’s commitments.  (R. at 3).  In Professor Bennet’s English 
class, Wickham failed to attend fifteen out of twenty-eight classes.  (R. at 3).  Wickham’s 
final paper comprised sixty percent of the entire grade, and due to his use of improper 
grammar, numerous misspellings, and unforgiveable factual errors, Professor Bennet 
assigned him the letter grade of “F.”  (R. at 4).  Pursuant to CSP’s athletic division rules, 
receiving such a grade precludes a student from competing in any sports for the following 
semester.  (R. at 4).  Petitioner feared that if CSP were to change Wickham’s grade 
administratively, news of this move would be leaked to the media, and invite criticism.  
(R. at 4).  Instead, Petitioner ordered Professor Bennet to re-grade Wickham’s paper, 
	  2 
such that he would be eligible to compete.  (R. at 4).  Professor Bennet refused to comply 
with Petitioner’s order.  (R. at 4).  Consequently, on May 22, 2013, Professor Bennet 
received a letter from Petitioner terminating her employment.  (R. at 4).  
On June 8, 2013, Professor Bennet brought an action against CSP, alleging that 
Petitioner—in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and in retaliation for the exercise of her First 
Amendment right to free speech—terminated Professor Bennet’s employment based on 
her refusal to change Wickham’s grade.  (R. at 4). Professor Bennet seeks monetary, and 
injunctive relief, demanding that CSP re-hire her.  (R. at 4).  On July 10, 2013, Petitioner 
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  (R. at 6).  
Professor Bennet filed her opposition to the motion on July 29, 2013.  (R. at 9).  The 
district court granted Petitioner’s motion to dismiss on August 26, 2013.  (R. at 13).  
Professor Bennet filed a notice of appeal on August 30, 2013, which the Sixteenth Circuit 
granted on September 20, 2013.  (R. at 18).  On June 5, 2014, the Sixteenth Circuit 
affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision, holding that grades 
constitute a form of symbolic speech, but noting the doctrine of academic freedom 
extends to both the university and the professor.  (R. at 19).  Petitioner filed its Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari on June 24, 2014.  (R. at 23).  This Court granted the Petition on 
October 15, 2014.  (R. at 24). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
I. The lower courts correctly held that grades constitute symbolic speech protected 
by the First Amendment.  In Spence, the Supreme Court recognized several factors to 
determine whether one’s conduct should be considered protected speech: (1) the intent of 
the speaker to convey a particularized message; (2) the likelihood that the message will 
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be understood by those who viewed it; and (3) the context in which the conduct alleged to 
be communicative takes place.  Here, it was Professor Bennet’s clear intent to 
communicate a message through the assignment of a specific letter grade.  Because 
Professor Bennet’s communicate act qualifies as symbolic speech, her refusal to comply 
with Petitioner’s directive does not amount to an act of insubordination.  Moreover, her 
refusal to obey Petitioner’s order to change a previously assigned grade was not a refusal 
to conform to the university’s standards, since the grade that she assigned to Wickham 
complied with the university’s grading policy.  The Sixth Circuit has specifically held 
that unjustifiably compelling a professor to change a grade contrary to the professor’s 
professional judgment amounts to a violation of his constitutional rights.  Accordingly, 
this Court should affirm the Sixteenth Circuit’s holding that Petitioner violated Professor 
Bennet’s constitutional rights because grades are a form of symbolic speech protected by 
the First Amendment. 
II.  The Sixteenth Circuit correctly held that the doctrine of academic freedom 
protects Professor Bennet’s assignment of grades because the Supreme Court in Sweezy 
held that this right vests in both the professor and the university.  Admittedly, Professor 
Bennet’s speech was made pursuant to her official duties, but this Court should not apply 
Garcetti because the present case involves matters of scholarship and teaching.  Because 
Petitioner possessed the ability to change Wickham’s grade administratively, but instead 
compelled Professor Bennet to change it, Petitioner’s interests in preserving the school’s 
efficiency and operations do not outweigh Professor Bennet’s First Amendment rights.  
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Sixteenth Circuit’s holding and find that the 
doctrine of academic freedom extends to Professor Bennet. 
	  4 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURTS CORRECTLY HELD THAT PROFESSOR BENNET’S 
ASSIGNMENT OF GRADES WARRANTS CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
BECAUSE HER COMMUNICATIVE ACT QUALIFIES AS A FORM OF 
SYMBOLIC SPEECH PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A.  The Supreme Court has afforded constitutional protection to the expression of 
ideas that qualify as symbolic speech under the First Amendment. 
The First Amendment right of free speech is not plenary—it does not protect 
every mode of communication that expresses an idea.  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 376 (1968) (holding that substantial, strong, and compelling governmental interests 
may justify certain regulations of non-speech First Amendment freedoms).  Because the 
Supreme Court has not held that all conduct deserves constitutional protection, the Court 
considers the following factors to determine whether the expression of an idea merits 
First Amendment protections: (1) the speaker’s intention to “convey a particularized 
message”; (2) the likelihood of that message being understood by those who view it; and 
(3) the surrounding context.  Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) 
(holding that the context in which a symbol functions to convey a message, or express an 
idea, imports value because the context can provide additional meaning to the symbol).  
Despite the primitive nature of symbols, the Supreme Court has recognized 
symbols to be an effective way to communicate ideas.  See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633–34 (1943) (concluding that a flag salute qualifies as 
a form of expression and warrants constitutional protection); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that the wearing of black armbands 
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in a school environment qualified as protected speech because it unquestionably 
conveyed a message about a matter of public concern—an issue that was of “intense 
public concern” at the time); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966) (holding 
that a sit-in by black students, in a “whites only” library, constituted protected symbolic 
speech).  These cases represent acts of deliberate expression, which are sufficiently 
imbued with the necessary aspects of communication to deserve constitutional protection.  
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.  Whether Professor Bennet’s First Amendment 
rights were violated when Petitioner directed her to change Wickham’s grade hinges on 
whether or not the assignment of grades by public university professors satisfies the 
elements of communication laid out by this Court in Spence.  See Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. at 411. 
B.  Professor Bennet’s assignment of grades qualifies as symbolic speech because 
her conduct meets the standard laid out by this Court in Spence. 
Within the context of the academic environment, the assignment of grades 
transmits a particularized message to the students that receive them.  Parate v. Isibor, 868 
F.2d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1989) (concluding that a professor’s discretion to assign grades 
according to his professional judgment contributes to his individual teaching method).  In 
Parate, the Sixth Circuit described a written evaluation that indicates “excellent work,” 
and the letter grade “A,” as being synonymous with one another, since both modes of 
communication represent symbols that reflect a particularized message.  Id. at 827.  In the 
present case, Professor Bennet specifically intended to convey a message of disapproval 
to Wickham by assigning him the letter grade of “F.”  The numerous misspellings, use of 
improper grammar, and unforgiveable factual errors in Wickham’s final paper are just a 
	  6 
few examples that justify the “F” that he received from Professor Bennet.  Most students 
enrolled in institutions of higher education, such as CSP, understand the meaning and 
significance of grades.  In fact, the student in this case, Wickham, transferred to CSP 
from New York University, which proves he was obviously familiar with the role that 
grades and transcripts play in the academic process.   
In light of this academic environment, coupled with Wickham’s meager 
attendance and minimal efforts in Professor Bennet’s class, Wickham could not have 
misunderstood his letter grade of “F” to indicate anything other than Professor Bennet’s 
dissatisfaction of his performance in her class.  Under these circumstances, a student 
might even anticipate or expect such a grade.  Moreover, all other schools and professors 
understand the universal message that an “F” conveys as well.  As demonstrated by 
Petitioner’s attempts to force Professor Bennet to change Wickham’s grade, the athletic 
department of CSP interpreted Wickham’s “F” to indicate his ineligibility to continue 
playing on the school’s basketball team, since the athletic department knows that such a 
grade violates CSP’s athletic division rules.  Because Professor Bennet’s conduct in 
assigning grade sends a specific and unique message to the individual student, her 
communicative act qualifies as a form of symbolic speech and warrants some degree of 
protection under the First Amendment.  Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d at 827.  
C.  Circuit decisions holding that grades are not protected by the First Amendment 
are distinguishable from Professor Bennet’s case because her conduct did not 
violate the university’s grading policy. 
 Each academic institution may decide how to appropriate the authority to assign 
grades among its faculty.  Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding 
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that professors do not possess any fundamental right to teach classes that do not conform 
to the university’s grading policies).  Thus, where a professor has violated the grading 
policy of an institution, his termination does not necessarily entitle him to relief.  Id. at 
891.  In Wozniak, professors were required to grade on a prescribed curve as an effort to 
ensure consistency across the divided sections, and professors were also required to 
submit their grading materials—the latter of which the petitioner in that case failed to do.  
Id. at 889.  His failure to comply with these grading requirements allowed the university 
to terminate him without violating the professor’s constitutional rights.  Id. at 891 
(holding that the professor’s termination resulted from his behavior, and not as a penalty 
for his speech about that behavior).  Unlike Wozniak, Professor Bennet’s assignment of 
grades complied with Petitioner’s grading policy, and did not violate any policy or 
mission of CSP’s.  See Wozniak, 236 F.2d at 891. 
A university’s decision to not renew a professor’s contract may also stem from 
the fact that the professor’s individual teaching methods are not preferable or conducive 
to the school’s goals and policies.  Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(holding that the First Amendment does not preclude a university from terminating a 
teacher if his pedagogical approach and philosophy do not align with the university’s 
standards, goals, and missions).  For instance, the First Circuit has held in favor of a 
university’s ability to not renew a teacher’s contract where the professor failed to heed 
instruction from the university, requesting him to amend his high grading standards and 
lower his expectations.  Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 424 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(noting that the professor’s criticism of the university’s need to elevate its standards 
generated “receptivity,” rather than “hostility,” towards these voiced concerns).  
	  8 
Even if the university in Lovelace failed to renew the professor’s contract in 
retaliation to the professor’s refusal to change his personal grading standards, the First 
Circuit held that the university must be allowed to determine for itself certain decisions, 
such as what target population it seeks to attract, the class content and homework load it 
prefers to assign, and its own general grading policies.  Lovelace, 793 F.2d at 425.  
Therefore, the First Circuit in Lovelace concluded that the university lawfully terminated 
the professor because the teacher’s elevated grading standards conflicted with the 
university’s core concerns.  Id. at 425.  These Circuit decisions highlight the difference 
between a professor’s refusal to change an individual grade, and the professor’s refusal to 
conform to the university’s grading policies that dovetail the school’s mission. 
The First Circuit in Lovelace also made a distinction between the professor’s 
speech, which criticized the university’s grading standards, and the professor’s act of 
refusing to change his own, individual grading standards where they conflicted with the 
university’s mission.  Id. at 425 (holding that the professor’s action, of disobeying the 
university’s request for the professor to amend his grading standards in order to conform 
with the university’s, constituted an act of insubordination not protected by the First 
Amendment); see also Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State University, 665 F.2d 547, 552 
(5th Cir. 1982) (differentiating between the exercise of First Amendment rights and acts 
of plain insubordination, the former of which played no substantial role in the nonrenewal 
decision).  Unlike the present case, where Petitioner compelled Professor Bennet to 
change Wickham’s grade, the university in Hillis changed the student’s grade 
administratively.  See Hillis, 665 F.2d at 550. 
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Professor Bennet’s refusal to change Wickham’s grade does not amount to an act 
of insubordination because her conduct was not a refusal to conform to the university’s 
standards.  Rather, Professor Bennet merely refused to change an individual grade that 
she intended to assign to her student—a grade that the student earned, and indeed 
complied with CSP’s grading policies.  Moreover, Petitioner’s ability to change 
Wickham’s grade administratively renders the directive to Professor Bennet unnecessary.  
By unjustifiably compelling Professor Bennet to change a student’s grade, contrary to her 
professional judgment, Petitioner precluded Professor Bennet from conveying a message 
that she intended to send to her student.  Therefore, Professor Bennet merely exercised 
her constitutional rights when she refused to follow Petitioner’s directive, which resulted 
in an unlawful termination.  See Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d at 827. 
II. THE SIXTEENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM EXTENDS TO PROFESSOR BENNET BECAUSE THE SUPREME 
COURT HAS SPECIFICALLY HELD THAT THIS RIGHT VESTS IN BOTH 
THE PROFESSOR AND THE UNIVERSITY. 
A.  This Court has held that academic freedom vests in both the professor and the 
university. 
The Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of academic freedom belongs to both 
the university and the professor.  See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 
(1957).  In Sweezy, Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence outlines four essential freedoms 
that specifically belong to the university: the freedom to decide what to teach, how it is 
taught, who will teach, and who will be admitted.  Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(concluding that a free society depends on free universities, meaning free from 
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governmental interference in the intellectual life of a university).  However, the Supreme 
Court in Sweezy also held that professors and students alike must remain free to inquire, 
learn, and understand because the failure to do so would lead to the stagnation and death 
of our civilization.  Id. at 250.  Therefore, Professor Bennet’s assignment of grades must 
be protected by the doctrine of academic freedom in order for both the educators and the 
students to gain new maturity and comprehension.  See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. 
 Various Circuit decisions have also recognized that the doctrine of academic 
freedom extends to both the professor and the university.  See, e.g., Hillis v. Stephen F. 
Austin State University, 665 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that academic 
freedom stems from the First Amendment to protect against infringements on a teacher’s 
freedom concerning classroom content and method); Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 
515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that the term academic freedom is 
equivocal, denoting freedoms of both the university and the professor); cf. Urofsky v. 
Gilmore, 219 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 200) (concluding that, if the Constitution recognizes 
any right of academic freedom, it inheres in the university, not in individual professors).  
In Hillis, the Fifth Circuit held that the professor in that case made one credible 
First Amendment claim, which related to his criticism of Dr. Creighton Delaney—the 
university’s Art Department head who ordered the professor to assign a specific student 
the letter grade of “B.”  Hillis, 665 F.2d at 552.  However, the Fifth Circuit held in favor 
of the university in Hillis because the professor in that case failed to show that his refusal 
to assign a grade as instructed constituted a “teaching method.”  Id. at 553.  Moreover, 
the professor’s protected rights to protest and criticize did not play a substantial role in 
the university’s nonrenewal decision.  Id. at 552 (concluding that, absent any exercise of 
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constitutionally protected rights, a professor may be terminated for any reason, or no 
reason at all).  Unlike Professor Bennet, the professor in Hillis tarnished his renewal 
prospects by evidencing his continual lack of cooperation and unacceptable conduct on 
multiple occasions—all of which are absent from the facts in Professor Bennet’s case.  
See Hillis, 665 F.2d at 551–552.  More importantly, Hillis differs from the present case 
because the university in Hillis ultimately assigned the desired grade administratively, 
whereas, in the present case, Petitioner chose to compel Professor Bennet to change the 
grade, rather than changing it administratively.  See Hillis, 665 F.2d at 552. 
Even the Sixth Circuit in Parate agreed that a professor does not possess a 
constitutional interest in the grades his students ultimately receive.  See Parate, 868 F.2d 
at 829.  In other words, a university may change a student’s grade administratively, but it 
may not preclude a professor from communicating his personal evaluations to his 
students.  Id. at 829.  By failing to change Wickham’s grade administratively, and instead 
ordering Professor Bennet to change a previously assigned change, Petitioner 
unconstitutionally compelled Professor Bennet’s speech, which severely burdens a 
protected activity.  Id. at 828.  
In Piarowski, the Seventh Circuit weighed the interests of both parties in order to 
strike a balance.  See Piarowski v. Ill. Cmt. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d at 628 (holding that 
universities do not have carte blanche to regulate the expression of ideas of its faculty 
members).  Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit in Piarowski held that the university’s 
interests did not justify forbidding the professor to display his art anywhere on campus, 
but the school’s interests did permit its directive, which ordered the professor to move his 
art to a more appropriate gallery in the building.  Id. at 630 (explaining that the 
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professor’s expression of ideas were regulated, rather than suppressed, by relocating the 
art). Balancing the competing interests of both parties invites this Court to allow a 
professor to assign grades according to the professor’s judgment, while permitting the 
university to terminate the professor when, or if, such grade assignments violate the 
school’s standards or policies. Courts have used a similar balancing test to weigh the 
interests of both parties in determining whether or not a public employee’s speech 
outweighs the interests of the employer in regulating that speech.  See Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
The Fourth Circuit has held that if a public employee’s speech fails to touch upon 
matters of public concern, the employer may regulate it without infringing on any of the 
employee’s constitutional rights.  Urofsky v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 401, 406–407 (4th Cir. 
2000) (holding that any inquiry of whether or not a public employee’s speech touches 
upon a matter of public concern does not involve a determination of how interesting or 
important the subject is).  Professor Bennet’s case differs from Urofsky because the 
professors in Urofsky challenged the constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited 
their conduct, whereas in the present case, no state statute exists prohibiting Professor 
Bennet’s assignment of the letter grade of “F.”  See Urofsky, 219 F.2d at 405–06.  In fact, 
no CSP policy prohibits such an assignment of the letter grade “F,” which explains why 
Petitioner’s actions violate her constitutionally protected right to speech.  See Settle v. 
Dickson County. Sch. Bd., 53 F.2d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that, as long as no 
positive law or school policy is violated, professors possess broad authority to assign 
grades based on the merits of their students work).   
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B.  The Supreme Court’s Pickering test tilts in favor of Professor Bennet because 
Petitioner’s interests in restricting her speech do not outweigh Professor Bennet’s 
protected rights. 
Because a university serves the dual role as both a public employer that provides 
public services, and as a governmental entity, operating under the constraints of the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court determines whether a public employee’s speech 
addresses a matter of public concern before granting it constitutional protection. See 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 568 (1968)).  In Pickering, the Supreme Court balanced the interests of the public 
employee’s interest—to comment on matters of public concern—with the employer’s 
interests in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.  Id. at 568 (concluding that a teacher’s opportunity to contribute to public 
debate outweighs the school administration’s interests when a teacher’s proper 
performance and daily duties in the classroom are unaffected or interfered with).   
Because grades constitute an important aspect of an educator’s teaching style, and 
because Professor Bennet’s assignment of grades fails to disrupt the efficiency and daily 
operations of CSP, Petitioner’s interests in compelling Professor Bennet to change a 
previously assigned grade does not outweigh Professor Bennet’s employee-speech rights.  
See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572 (emphasizing the essentiality for teachers to speak freely 
on questions of public concern without fear of retaliatory dismissal).   
The Supreme Court has held that citizens necessarily accept certain limitations on 
their freedoms upon entering government service.  See Garcetti v. Cebellos, 391 U.S. 
410, 418 (2006). (analyzing whether the First Amendment protects a government 
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employee from discipline based on employee’s speech made pursuant to his official 
duties).  However, this Court has long held that teachers do not shed the constitutional 
rights that they enjoy as citizens merely upon their condition as public employees.  
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 592 (1967) (noting that even legitimate and 
substantial governmental purposes cannot be pursued by means that stifle fundamental 
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved).  Professor Bennet should not be 
expected to abandon her First Amendment right to speech when the school’s efficiency 
and functions are unharmed, and Petitioner possessed the ability to achieve its ends by 
changing Wickham’s grade administratively.   
C.  Garcetti does not apply to Professor Bennet because the present case involves 
matters of scholarship and teaching. 
Admittedly, governmental entities have broad discretion to restrict speech when it 
acts in its role as an employer.  Garcetti,v. Ceballos, 391 U.S. at 418 (adding that 
supervisors must ensure that their employees’ official communications are accurate and 
sound).  Because public employees may potentially express views that impair proper 
performance of governmental functions, the Supreme Court in Garcetti held that an 
employee’s speech made pursuant to his official duties does not warrant the same degree 
of strict scrutiny that the First Amendment requires.  Id. at 423 (holding that the 
supervisors in that case had the authority to take proper corrective action).  This Court 
should not consider termination to be the proper corrective action for Professor Bennet 
simply doing her job, and assigning grades fairly and appropriately.  Such a 
determination would cast a “pall of orthodoxy” over the classroom, and would not 
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safeguard the academic freedom that this Court regards as vital to American schools.  See 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. at 603.   
Furthermore, Professor Bennet’s assignment of grades constitutes symbolic 
speech, whereas the employee’s speech made pursuant to his official duties in Garcetti 
constituted work product.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 423.  Unlike the assignment 
of grades, the work product in Garcetti demanded attention from the employee’s 
supervisors.  Id. at 423.  If this Court were to apply Garcetti to the present case, and 
demand that Petitioner oversee every single grade that every professor assigns to every 
student, a largely inefficient task would be unfairly imposed on CSP, which would truly 
impair Petitioner’s daily operations and functions.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.  In fact, 
such a task would indeed disrupt the efficiency and daily operations that the Pickering 
test seeks to account for and preserve by balancing competing interests.  See Pickering, 
391 U.S. at 572.  For the following reasons, this Court should not apply Garcetti to 
Professor Bennet’s case.  See Garcetti, 391 U.S. at 423.  Because the Supreme Court 
failed to extend the holding in Garcetti to matters of scholarship and teaching, this Court 
need not apply Garcetti to Professor Bennet’s case.  Id. at 425. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER 
The Sixteenth Circuit correctly held that Petitioner violated Professor Bennet’s 
constitutional rights because grades are a form of symbolic speech protected by the First 
Amendment, and Professor Bennet’s assignment of grades meets the standard laid out in 
Spence.  Because Petitioner possessed the ability to change Wickham’s grade 
administratively, yet insisted on compelling Professor Bennet to change it, Petitioner’s 
directive was unnecessary.  By unjustifiably precluding Professor Bennet from 
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communicating a message to her student through the assignment of a letter grade, 
Professor Bennet merely exercised her constitutional rights in refusing to follow 
Petitioner’s directive to change a previously assigned grade.  Her refusal was not an act 
of insubordination because her conduct qualifies as symbolic speech, and it was not a 
refusal to conform to Petitioner’s standards or policies, since the “F” that Professor 
Bennet assigned to Wickham complied with the university’s grading policies.  Although 
Professor Bennet assigned the “F” pursuant to her official duties, the Supreme Court 
failed to apply Garcetti to matters involving scholarship or teaching, such as the present 
case.  Accordingly, Respondent respectfully prays this Court affirm the Sixteenth 
Circuit’s holding that academic freedom extends to both the professor and the university, 
and grants the injunctive and monetary relief that Professor Bennet seeks.  
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U.S. CONST. amend. I 
 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
